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Inflation can “grease” the wheels of the labor market by relaxing downward wage 
rigidity but it can also increase uncertainty and have a negative “sand” effect. This 
paper studies the grease effect of inflation by looking at whether the interaction 
between inflation and labor market regulations affects how employment responds 
to changes in output. The results show that in industrial countries with highly 
regulated labor markets, the grease effect of inflation dominates the sand effect. In 
the case of developing countries, we rarely find a significant effect of inflation or 
labor market regulations and provide evidence indicating that this could be due to 
the presence of a large informal sector and limited enforcement of de jure labor 
market regulations.  
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1. Introduction 
 
In his 1972 Presidential Address to the American Economic Association, James Tobin stated: 
“Unemployment and inflation still preoccupy and perplex economists, statesmen, journalists, housewives, 
and everyone else. …The connection between them is… the major area of controversy and ignorance in 
macroeconomics.” In the same paper, Tobin suggested “No one has devised a way of controlling average 
wage rates without intervening in the competitive struggle over relative wages. Inflation lets this struggle 
proceed and blindly, impartially, impersonally, and nonpolitically scales down all its outcomes” (Tobin, 
1972 p.13). In other words, inflation may play a beneficial role by adding grease to the wheels of the 
labor market.
1  Five years later, Milton Friedman’s Nobel Lecture focused on the sand effects of inflation. 
According to the sand view, inflation increases uncertainty and, by arbitrarily changing relative prices and 
wages, leads to resource misallocation and lower levels of employment (Friedman, 1977). 
The empirical evidence has not been kind to the grease hypothesis. Akerlof, Dickens, and Perry 
(1996, 2000) find some evidence in support of the idea that when inflation is below 1.5 percent there is a 
long-run tradeoff between inflation and unemployment. Card and Hyslop (1996) find evidence that an 
increase in inflation allows real wages to fall faster, but they find no evidence that inflation affects wage 
adjustment across local labor markets. Groshen and Schweitzer (1997) use firm-level data to distinguish 
the grease effect of inflation from its sand effect.  They find that while inflation below 5 percent has a 
positive but not statistically significant grease effect, inflation above 5 percent has a statistically 
significant sand effect. 
The main claim of this paper is that the lack of success in identifying the grease effect of inflation 
is due to the focus on the US labor market,
2 which, being among the most flexible in the world, does not 
need much grease to start with. In fact, one would expect that grease effects should be more important in 
the highly regulated European labor market than in the fairly flexible US market. We tackle this issue by 
looking at whether the interaction between inflation and labor market regulations affects how 
employment responds to changes in output (the employment Okun coefficient). We find strong evidence 
that in industrial countries with highly regulated labor markets, inflation reduces the sensitivity of 
employment to changes in output. We also find some evidence in support of the idea that lower 
employment elasticity is driven by the fact that inflation increases real wage flexibility. We conclude that 
                                                       
1 The grease hypothesis suggests that inflation can speed the adjustment to the long run equilibrium but is consistent 
with the idea of a vertical long-run Phillips Curve. A second class of models rejects the idea of a vertical long-run 
Phillips Curve and, by using near-rational wage setting behavior, shows that at low levels of inflation there is a long-
run trade-off between inflation and unemployment (Akerlof, Dickens, and Perry, 2000). 
2 A notable exception is Decressin and Decressin (2002). They use individual-level data for Germany to evaluate the 
grease and sand of effect of inflation. Their results are similar to those of Groshen and Schweitzer (1997), and they 
conclude that inflation does not weaken the macroeconomic effects of labor market regulations.   3
in industrial countries with highly regulated labor markets, the grease effect of inflation dominates the 
sand effect. We find that the opposite is true for industrial countries that are characterized by more 
flexible labor markets. In this set of countries (which includes the United States), we find that inflation 
increases employment elasticity and, thus, the sand effect of inflation dominates the grease effect. This 
suggests that inflation does grease the wheels of the labor market, but only those that squeak the most. 
Looking at developing countries, we rarely find a statistically significant effect of inflation or 
labor market regulations. We posit that this may be because most developing countries do not enforce 
regulations. We present some evidence in support of this hypothesis by showing that the effect of 
inflation and labor market regulations is higher in countries characterized by higher levels of rule of law.  
Three papers that are closely related to our work are Ball (1997), Wyplosz (2001), and González 
(2002). The first paper studies the disinflation process in 20 OECD countries and shows that disinflation 
was associated with an increase in the natural rate of unemployment. Ball (1997) also shows that the 
effect of the disinflation process was larger in countries characterized by a highly regulated labor market. 
Wyplosz (2001) recognizes that the grease and sand effect of inflation may vary with the degree of labor 
market rigidities and studies the cases of Germany, France, the Netherlands, and Switzerland. His results 
differ from those of Groshen and Schweitzer (1997) because he finds a sand effect at very low levels of 
inflation and a grease effect at higher levels of inflation. González (2002) computes employment and 
unemployment Okun coefficients for a large set of Latin American countries over the 1970-1996 period 
and discusses how structural reforms and the disinflation process may have affected how employment and 
unemployment respond to output shocks. Contrary to our work, however, González does not test formally 
the presence of a relationship among employment elasticity, labor market regulation, and inflation. 
Finally, this paper is also related to Blanchard (1999) and Blanchard and Wolfer’s (2000) work 
emphasizing the importance of the interaction between economic shocks and labor market institutions.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses a highly stylized model that 
relates employment to inflation and labor market regulations. Section 3 presents the empirical evidence 
on the determinants of employment elasticity. Section 4 looks at wage rigidity. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. A  Simple  Model 
 
We set the stage for the empirical analysis by discussing an extremely stylized model that focuses on the 
interaction between inflation and labor market regulations. This model is a basic extension of Bertola   4
(1990) and has no pretense of originality.
3 However, we think it useful to clarify the ideas and provide a 
clear set of testable hypotheses. 
Bertola (1990) studies the problem of a risk-neutral representative firm that chooses employment 
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He defines the process {} t Z  as an index of business conditions and  ) , ( i t i t L Z R + +  as the operating 
revenues obtained by employing L homogenous workers. The function  ) , ( i t i t L Z R + +  is assumed to be 
increasing and concave in L, with  ) 0 , ( i t Z R + =0. All the variables are described in real terms and the 
wage process {} t W  is assumed to be exogenous and will be described later. The firm faces firing costs 
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We assume that firing costs F depend on an index of labor market regulations ) 1 , 0 ( ∈ ρ , with 
F’>0 and F(0)=0.  Changes in business conditions are modeled using a two-state Markov chain. The 
economy moves from a “good” state of the world ( ) g Z  to a “bad” ( ) g b Z Z <  state of the world with 
probability g P − 1 , and moves from a bad state of the world to a good state of the world with 
probability b P − 1 .  To simplify the analysis, we assume that  b P =0. This is equivalent to assuming that 
bad states of the world only last one period.  Following Bertola, we assume that the firm initiates all 
separations and that desired employment is higher in good times. Formally:  0 > Z R , and  0 > ZL R .  
In the absence of nominal rigidities, real wages would be exogenously set to  g W  in good states of 
the world, and set equal to the reservation wage (W ) in bad states of the world (W < g W ). It is assumed 
that the differential between  g W  and the reservation wage is smaller than the one that would lead to a 
                                                       
3 Note for the referees: The model could be dropped or moved to the Appendix. 
4 Bertola (1990) assumes both firing and hiring costs.   5
lower level of employment in the good state of the world (therefore, it is always true that  b L ≤ g L ).  We 
now depart from Bertola (1990) and assume nominal wage rigidities (this is the only significant departure 
with respect to Bertola’s paper). We model nominal rigidities in a rather brutal way and assume that in 
bad states of the world real wages are given by:  
 
W W W t t t b ) 1 ( ) 1 ( 1 , ρ π ρ − + − = −      (3) 
 
where π  is inflation and  1 − t W  is the real wage in the previous period.
5 In highly regulated labor markets 
(ρ =1), nominal wages in period t are equal to nominal wages in period t-1. Therefore, real wages in 
period t are equal to real wages in the previous period minus inflation in period t. In labor markets with no 
rigidities, bad time real wages are set equal to the reservation wage W .
6  Clearly the above equation 
relies on the strong assumption that either workers only care about nominal wage and not real wages (if 
not indexation would arise) or that they are myopic and always expect inflation to be equal to zero. So, 
Equation 3 does not allow any room for indexation (either to past or current inflation).  
As we assumed that bad states of the world last only one period, we can rewrite Equation 3 as:  
 
W W W t g t b ) 1 ( ) 1 ( , ρ π ρ − + − =      ( 3 ’ )  
 
  At this point, it is important to note that Equations 2 and 3 assume that the index of labor market 
regulations affects both firing costs and wage flexibility.  Bertola and Rogerson (1997) provide a rationale 
for such an assumption. They point out that without wage rigidities, job protection makes little sense 
because entrepreneurs would have the option to drive real wages close to zero and thus make job 
protection irrelevant. The same would apply to a situation in which entrepreneurs cannot touch real wages 
but can fire at will. It is therefore natural that the political and economic institutions that lead to a high 
level of job protection will also lead to higher wage rigidity.
7 We use data from Botero et al. (2003) to 
                                                       
5 To be more precise, we should set  [ ] W W W Max W t t
b
t , ) 1 ( ) 1 ( 1 ρ π ρ − + − = − . To simplify things, we will 
assume that [ ] W W W t t ≥ − + − − ) 1 ( ) 1 ( 1 ρ π ρ . This is equivalent to assuming that  W W t t ≥ − − ) 1 ( 1 π . 
6 We assume no correlation between W andρ . However, the reservation wage is likely to be affected by factors 
like unemployment insurance, which in turn could be correlated with the presence of labor market regulations.   
7 Bertola and Rogerson (1997) state: “the apparent association of wage equalization and job security provisions can 
be intuitively rationalized in terms of simple politico-economic considerations. When implemented in isolation, 
neither wage compression nor dismissal restrictions can fulfill a likely aim of intervention in the labor market—
namely stabilization of labor incomes in the face of idiosyncratic (yet uninsurable) labor-demand shocks  (p. 1169).   6
check whether there is empirical support for a positive correlation between the institutional determinants 
of wage rigidity and firing costs. In particular, we look at the correlation between their index of job 
security and their index of industrial relation laws. The latter measures, among other things, the presence 
and extent of a collective bargain system and the regulation of collective disputes. These factors should in 
turn proxy for the power of unions and hence for the institutional determinants of wage rigidity. Figure 1 
indicates that there is a strong correlation between the two variables.  
We solve the model using the same procedure used by Bertola (1990). Define the marginal 
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Assuming that the state of the world is observed before setting  t L , we have the following set of first-
order conditions: 
 
0 ) ( ≤ ≤ − t S F ρ       ( 5 )  
1 0 − > = t t t L L if S       ( 6 )  
1 ) ( − < − = t t t L L if F S ρ      (7) 
 
Labor demand is defined by a pair of employment levels  b g L L ≥ that satisfy the first-order conditions in 
5, 6, and 7. As quits are ruled out, labor demand also defines total employment. The latter will only 
decrease when the condition switches from good to bad, and increase when the condition switches from 
bad to good. In the presence of high firing costs or high wage flexibility, the firm may decide not to hire 
or fire. In this case employment will be constant across states of the world. For the sake of simplicity, we 
rule out this possibility and restrict our analysis to the case in which  b g L L > . By substituting the 
definition of  t S  in the first order condition for good times, using the law of iterated expectations, and 
noting that  () 1 + t t S E = g P ×0+(1- g P )×(-F), it is easy to derive the following equation:  
 
( ) g g g g P
r
F
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Equation 8 implicitly defines labor demand in good times. It shows that positive firing costs cause good 
time wages to be lower than the value of the marginal product of labor. The concavity of R implies that 
employment is decreasing in M(Z,L). Therefore, the presence of firing costs leads to less hiring during 
good times. Recalling that we assumed  b P =0 (hence,  ( ) 1 + t t S E =0), we can use the same procedure and 
derive the equation that implicitly defines labor demand in bad times: 
 
( ) ) ( ) 1 ( ) , ( ρ π ρ F W W W L Z M g b b − + − − =     (9) 
 
With positive firing costs, bad time wages are above the marginal product of labor (with no rigidities, the 
marginal product of labor would be equal to the reservation wage).  The effect of labor market regulations 
on employment during bad times is not clear. On the one hand, they increase firing costs and lead to 
higher employment during bad times. On the other hand, they reduce wage flexibility and keep wages 
above the reservation wages and thus lead to less employment.  
          In contrast, the effect of inflation is clear. It always increases wage flexibility and therefore leads to 
more employment (with respect to a situation with lower inflation) during bad times. In this sense, the 
model does not predict any sand effect of inflation and only allows for a grease effect. A sand effect of 
inflation could be introduced by making marginal revenues negatively depend on inflation. 
Figure 2 summarizes the main finding of the model. By increasing firing costs, labor market 
regulations lower labor demand (leading to lower employment) during good times. For the same reason, 
they increase labor demand during bad times. This positive effect on employment is counterbalanced by 
the fact that labor market regulations reduce wage flexibility and, by keeping wages above the reservation 
wage, may reduce employment. The overall effect on employment in bad times is therefore uncertain.  
A clear implication of the model is that the effect of inflation is amplified by the presence of labor 
market regulations. In fact, if we were to assume that the labor market is perfectly flexible (i.e., ρ =0), 





The key message of the model of Section 2 is that inflation plays a useful grease role only in highly 
regulated labor markets. In this section, we estimate how the interaction between inflation and labor 
                                                       
8 This can also be seen by computing the derivative:  g
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market regulations affects the sensitivity of employment with respect to output. In particular, we will 
focus on the employment Okun coefficient (defined as the change in employment brought about by a 
change in output). We expect the Okun coefficient to be low when most of the adjustment to an output 
shock goes through a change in wages, and we expect the Okun coefficient to be high when most of the 
adjustment goes through employment. Within the framework of the model of Section 2, we can write the 
Okun coefficient as: 
 
)) ( ( )) ( ( 1 1 − − − = − t t t t Z M L Z M L L L      ( 1 0 )  
 
where L is a labor demand function and, by concavity of R, L’<0.  By substituting Equations 8 and 9 into 
Equation 10, we can rewrite the Okun coefficient as a function of the exogenous variables:  
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The main prediction of the model is that  0 , < ρ π G . We test this hypothesis by using the following 
specification:  
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         (12) 
 
where DE measures employment growth or its deviation (in percentage terms) from a log-linear trend (the 
deviation with respect to a HP trend yields similar results). We focus our analysis on employment (and 
not unemployment) because employment is measured more accurately and it is less affected by labor 
market participation decisions. In the robustness analysis, we will show that our results are robust to 
substituting employment with unemployment.  DY is GDP growth (or its deviation from a log linear 
trend).
9  INF is inflation, REG an index of labor market regulations, α  a country fixed effect, and YEAR 
a time trend.
10 The parameters in parenthesis ( 2 a ,  3 a , and  4 a ) tell us how inflation, labor market 
regulations, and the interaction between the two affect employment elasticity. While the model of the 
previous section predicts  2 a  to be negative, we already pointed out that the model could be modified (by 
introducing a sand effect) to make the sign of  2 a  uncertain. Hence, we do not have a clear prediction for 
                                                       
9 We use growth rate or deviation from trend because both employment and GDP are highly persistent.   9
the sign of  2 a . We also do not have a clear prediction for  3 a . In fact, labor market regulations could 
either increase (through their effect on wages) or decrease (thorough their effect on firing costs) 
employment elasticity. Our main parameter of interest is the one that measures the effect of the 
interaction between inflation and labor market regulations ( 4 a ). In this case, the model yields a clear 
prediction and we expect  4 a  to be negative, indicating that the grease effect of inflation is higher in 
countries with highly regulated labor markets. We do not have a clear prediction on the other variables 
that are introduced mainly as controls.  
  In order to estimate Equation 12, we need to identify a good proxy for REG. We measure labor 
market regulations by using an updated version of the job security index compiled by Pagés (2002) and 
based on Heckman and Pagés (2000) and Pagés and Montenegro (1999). The index of job security 
captures the marginal cost of dismissing a full-time worker with an open-ended contract. While this is not 
a perfect measure of job security, to the best of our knowledge it is the only available panel data set of the 
stringency on labor market regulations.
11  The original index measures dismissal costs in terms of 
monthly wages and ranges from zero (for the US) to 6.9 (for Venezuela until 1996). The industrial 
countries with the highest values of the index are Spain and Italy (with values that range between 3.2 and 
3.8). We normalize the index so that it ranges between zero and one. The average value for all countries is 
0.3, the average for industrial countries is 0.2 and the average for developing countries is 0.5 (see Table 
1). Because the job security index derived by Heckman and Pagés focuses on dismissal costs, it should be 
clear that in order to use it to test our model we need to follow Bertola and Rogerson (1997) and assume 
that there is a set of common factors that determines both dismissal costs and nominal wage rigidity.  
We estimate Equation 12 using two different panels that contain annual observations over the 
1982-2000 period (in the robustness analysis, we also reproduce the results using a panel where all 
variables are averaged over seven three-year periods). The first panel focuses on industrial countries and 
the second on developing countries. In the sample of developing countries, we drop all observations for 
which inflation is above 30 percent (the results do not change if we use other thresholds or include all 
observations). Table 1 reports summary statistics for the variables used in the regression; the data sources 
are described in the Appendix.
12  
                                                                                                                                                                           
10 Using year fixed effects yield similar results. 
11 Botero et al. (2003) cover a larger sample of countries but their data set is only cross-sectional. At the same time, 
the data set compiled by Nickell et al. (2001) is of a panel nature but does not cover developing countries. There are 
two problems with the Heckman and Pagés (2000) index. On the one hand, the index may overestimate the true 
marginal cost of dismissals because it does not measure the dismissal cost of temporary workers. On the other hand, 
the index may underestimate the true marginal cost of dismissals because it does not measure the legal costs that 
could arise if the worker challenges the dismissal. 
12 The panel is unbalanced. In the sample of industrial countries, we have observations for the whole period (1982-
2000) for Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Finland, France, Italy, Japan, Norway, Switzerland, United Kingdom   10
We start the analysis by running a set of standard fixed effects regressions. Next, we look at 
possible problems with the estimation technique by running random effects estimations, checking whether 
the results are driven by outliers, and correcting for the bias introduced by the presence of the lagged 
dependent variable. Then, we address the problem of reverse causality by running instrumental variable 
regressions. Finally, we check whether our results are robust to the use of alternative measures of job 
security. 
 
Evidence from Industrialized Countries 
 
Table 2 reports the results for industrial countries. Column 1 reports results for a standard fixed effects 
regression. It shows that the coefficient attached to DYINF  is positive and statistically significant, 
indicating that when REG = 0, inflation amplifies the employment response to changes in output. In 
particular, we find that moving from 0 percent inflation to 5 percent inflation leads to a five-fold increase 
in the employment Okun coefficient (first row of Table 3). This finding can be interpreted as evidence of 
a sand effect of inflation. We also find that the coefficient attached to DYREG is positive and statistically 
significant. This indicates that labor market regulations increase the elasticity of employment to changes 
in output (this is the opposite of what Bertola, 1990, finds in a cross-section of nine industrialized 
countries). The effect is extremely large in presence of zero inflation. In this case, increasing labor market 
regulations from zero to 0.25 (just above the average in industrial countries) increases the Okun 
coefficient by approximately seven times (first column of Table 3).  
As expected, we find that the coefficient attached to DYINFREG is negative and statistically 
significant. This indicates that the sand effect of inflation decreases when labor market regulations 
increase.  In fact, when REG is equal to 0.25, inflation becomes neutral (second row of Table 3),
13 and 
when REG is very high (0.4 or above) inflation starts greasing the wheels of the labor markets by 
substantially reducing employment elasticity.  In particular, when REG = 0.5 moving from 0 to 5 percent 
inflation reduces the employment Okun coefficient by exactly 50 percent (row three of Table 3).  We take 
these results as evidence that inflation does grease the wheels of the labor market—but only when they 
are rusty. When the labor market is flexible, inflation only has a sand effect.  
                                                                                                                                                                           
and United States. For Denmark, we only have data for the 1996-1999 period. In the case of the Netherlands and 
Sweden we do not have data for the 1993-1996 period. For Germany, we drop 1991and 1992 (because of the 
unification process). For New Zealand, we only have data for the 1990-1999 period. In the case of Greece, Portugal, 
and Spain we drop the 1980s because there are large outliers (the basic results do not change if Greece and Spain are 
included in the sample but they do not hold if Portugal is included). The results are robust to using only the countries 
for which we have a full sample. In the sample of developing countries, the number of observations ranges from 17 
(for Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Panama and Trinidad and Tobago) to two (Uruguay). 
13 It is exactly neutral when REG = 0.2.   11
Column 2 of Table 2 repeats the exercise of column 1 by restricting the sample to countries for 
which we do not have missing observations (so the panel of column 2 is balanced with 17 observations 
for each country). The results are unchanged.  
The use of a fixed effect model in the presence of a variable that has limited temporal variation 
(like our index of labor market regulations) could be problematic because the high correlation of such a 
variable with country fixed effects may exacerbate measurement error and greatly increase the noise-to-
signal ratio.  It should be pointed out, however, that while it is true that our index of labor market 
regulations has limited over time variation (this is why we are not particularly interested in  2 b ), what we 
are interested in is the interaction between changes in output, labor market regulations, and inflation. This 
is a variable that does have substantial variation over time.  In any case, we check for possible problems 
with the fixed effects specification by re-estimating the same model using a random effects specification 
(column 3). The results of the two models are almost identical. The only difference is that, as expected, 
REG is statistically significant in the random effect model but not in the fixed effect model.  
Column 4 estimates the same model of column 1 by substituting employment and GDP growth 
with their deviations from a log-linear trend. Again, the results are unchanged. Next, we run a STATA 
robust regressions procedure to check whether the results are driven by outliers (column 5).
14  The results 
(both the magnitude of the coefficients and the t-statistics) are very similar to those of column 1, 
indicating that our results are not driven by outliers.  
Another possible problem with the estimation of Equation 12 is the presence of the lagged 
dependent variable that may introduce a bias in the estimation of a fixed effect model. Column 6 
addresses this issue by using the, by now standard, first difference GMM estimator originally proposed by 
Arellano and Bond (1991). Again, we find no major difference with respect to the coefficients and t-
statistics of column 1. The last two rows of the table show that the over-identifying restrictions are valid 
(the Sargan test does not reject the null). While we reject the null hypothesis of no first-order correlation 
in the residual, we cannot reject the null of no second-order correlation (the presence of a second-order 
correlation would lead to inconsistent estimators).
15 Column 7 runs the Arellano and Bover (1995) system 
                                                       
14 This procedure starts by eliminating all outliers for which Cook’s distance is greater than one. Next, it weighs 
outliers by performing Huber and biweight iterations (STATA, 2002).  We obtain the same results by running 
quantile (median) regressions. 
15 The results of the model also agree with Bond’s (2002) rule of thumb for a well-specified GMM first difference 
model. In particular, he discusses that OLS estimates should provide an upper bound for the coefficient of the lagged 
dependent variable, fixed effect estimations a lower bound, and GMM estimations should be a convex combination 
of the two. This is exactly what we find. The point estimate of the coefficient attached to the lagged dependent 
variable is higher than the coefficient obtained with the fixed effect regression and lower than the one obtained with 
OLS (0.42, full OLS estimations not reported). The GMM estimations reported in column 6 use all the available lags 
of the explanatory variables as instruments. The results are robust to using different lag structures.    12
GMM estimator. Again, the results are unchanged. However, the high value of the Sargan test indicates 
that there may be problems with the specification.
16 
Next, we recognize that our results may be driven by the presence of reverse causality. It is in fact 
likely that a drop in employment would cause a drop in aggregate demand and hence a drop in GDP. 
Therefore, DY (and DYINF, DYREG, DYINFREG) is not exogenous with respect to DE. We address this 
issue by instrumenting DY (and DYINF, DYREG, DYINFREG) with an external demand shock measured 
by the trading partner’s GDP per capita growth (weighted by trade share). This variable has all the 
characteristics of a good instrument, as it is highly correlated with GDP growth and it is unlikely to have 
a direct effect on employment (or on employment elasticity). Column 8 shows that the instrumental 
variable estimates yield coefficients that are essentially identical to the ones of the fixed effect regression. 
In this case, however, we have loss of precision. The coefficient attached to DYINF is no longer 
statistically significant. However, the coefficient attached DYINFREG (and to DYREG) remains 
statistically significant (although its value drop substantially and its p-value increase from 0.02 to 0.09).   
Finally, we check whether our results are robust to using different indexes of labor market 
regulation. Columns 9 and 10 of Table 2 use the Botero et al. (2003) indices of job security and industrial 
relations law, while column 11 uses the Nickell et al. (2001) employment protection index.
17 The three 
columns yield the same message: employment elasticity is higher in highly regulated labor markets, and 
the effect of job elasticity decreases with inflation.  
Overall, we take the results of Table 2 as providing strong evidence that in industrial countries 
there is a robust correlation between the interaction of labor market regulations and inflation and the 






                                                       
16 All the estimations used in the paper were obtained by using STATA with the exception of the System GMM 
estimations that were obtained using the OX-DPD package. In the GMM-system estimations our set of instruments 
include 4 lags of the dependent variables. The results are unchanged if we use longer lag structure, but convergence 
takes much longer.  
17 One drawback of the Botero et al. indexes is that they are measured for the late 1990s and have no overtime 
variation. In order to use it in our panel regression, we make the assumption of no changes in labor regulations. For 
the employment protection index the data extend only until 1995; afterward the assumption was made of no changes 
in labor regulations. These regressions do not include New Zealand, which is a large outlier.  
18 There are two caveats with the results of Table 2. First of all, the results collapse if we run separate regressions for 
the 1980s and 1990s. This is probably due to the fact that the parameters are identified by the fact that average 
inflation decreased substantially from one decade to the other. (In the 1980s average inflation in OECD countries 
was 7.8 percent, while in the 1990s it was 2.6 percent). Second, while one would expect that the role of inflation   13
Evidence from Developing Countries 
 
Table 4 reproduces the same regressions of Table 2 for a sample of developing countries and Latin 
American countries (column 2).
19 We find that in most specifications inflation and labor market 
regulations do not significantly affect how employment responds to changes in output. In most cases we 
even find that DYINFREG has a positive sign (statistically significant in two cases), which is the opposite 
of what we expected. We take the evidence of Table 4 as indicating that there is no strong evidence that 
inflation and labor market regulations affect employment elasticity in developing countries. 
There are four possible reasons why we do not find any significant correlation between the 
interaction of inflation and labor market regulations and employment elasticity in developing countries. 
First of all, the lack of results may be due to the fact that the explanatory variables are measured with less 
precision in developing countries. In this case, the lack of a statistically significant result could be purely 
due to attenuation bias. Second, the result may be due to the presence of widespread indexation 
mechanisms that completely or partly offset the grease effect of inflation (Argentina and Brazil had 
indexation mechanisms until the early 1990s, and Chile still has one). Third, because of lack of 
enforcement, labor market regulations may not be binding. In this case, de jure regulations would be very 
different from de facto regulations explaining the lack of a statistically significant relationship between 
inflation, de jure labor market regulations, and employment elasticity. A fourth and related explanation 
has to do with the presence of a large informal sector. As a result, developing countries may end up 
having high levels of labor market flexibility even in the presence of strict regulations (see, for instance 
the discussion in Calvo and Mishkin, 2003).
20  
To control for the fact that de jure labor market regulations may differ from de facto labor market 
regulations, we divide our sample of developing countries into two groups. The first group contains all 
the country-years where the ICRG index of rule of law takes a value of 4 or higher (4 is the minimum 
value of rule of law in our sample of industrial countries). This is the group where de jure regulations are 
likely to coincide with de facto regulations. The second group includes countries with low rule of law (the 
ICRG index takes values below 4). In this subgroup, labor market regulations are likely to be less 
stringent (either because they are not applied or because there is a larger informal sector) than what would 
                                                                                                                                                                           
should be particularly strong during recessions, our results are not robust to dropping periods of economic 
expansion.  
19 Because of data availability (especially on labor market regulations) our sample only includes four non-Latin 
American developing countries: Hungary, South Korea, Poland, and Turkey. We drop Turkey from the regression 
because it never meets the requirement of inflation below 30 percent. 
20 Yet another explanation is related to the fact that we assumed a correlation between wage and employment 
rigidity. However, this correlation is likely to be weaker in developing countries that are not characterized by 
centralized wage bargaining (we would like to thank Carmen Pagés for pointing this out).   14
be predicted by their de jure value.
21 Table 5 shows the results of a set of regressions that separate the 
effect of labor market regulations in countries with high and low rule of law. The first column of the table 
runs a fixed effects regression for the complete sample of developing countries. The second column uses 
a random effects model, the third column uses robust regression, and the last two columns use the 
Arellano and Bond and Arellano and Bover GMM estimators. We now find that the coefficient attached 
to DYINFREG is always negative and statistically significant in countries with high levels of rule of law 
(DYINFREGHRL), while we find that the coefficient is never significant and always positive for countries 
with low levels of rule of law (DYINFREGLRL). These regressions seem to suggest that inflation does 
grease the wheels of the labor market in developing countries with large and effective labor market 
regulations.
22 These results should be taken with caution, however, because they are not robust to 
alternative definitions of high and low rule of law. 
 
Other Robustness Checks 
 
Before concluding this section, we run two others robustness checks (we run the robustness checks only 
for the sample of industrial countries). First, we test whether the results of Table 2 are robust to using 
unemployment instead of employment. Table 6 shows that the results are essentially identical (the 
dependent variable is the negative of the change in unemployment so that the coefficients have the same 
interpretation as the coefficients in Table 2). In fact, the unemployment regressions yield higher t-
statistics. Next, instead of yearly observations, we use a panel in which the observations are averaged 
over six three-year periods.
23 This robustness test is important for at least two reasons. First, employment 
responds to changes in output with a lag. Second, the theoretical model does not have clear indications on 
whether we should use current or lagged inflation and averaging variables provides a useful robustness 
test (if instead of using the level of inflation we use its deviation with respect to a linear of HP trend, we 
obtain results that are similar to the ones described above).  It should be pointed out that adjustment costs 
(which are affected by labor market regulations) are a key determinant of employment elasticity. As the 
longer the period of observation, the less important adjustment costs are, we expect that labor market 
regulations should have a smaller effect when we move from one-year to three-year averages.  
The results are reported in Table 7. Again, we find that DYINF and DYREG have a positive 
coefficient, indicating that they increase employment elasticity. And DYINFREG has a negative 
                                                       
21 One issue that we do not consider, but that it is likely to be important, is that the size of the informal sector may 
depend on how stringent labor market regulations are. 
22 The results are not robust to the use of instrumental variables. Endogeneity, however, should be less of a concern 
in this sample of developing countries (mostly Latin American) that are well known to be highly volatile because 
they are subject to large external shocks (IDB, 1995).   15
coefficient, indicating that the sand effect of inflation decreases when labor market regulations increase.  
The coefficients are statistically significant in the fixed effects, random effects, robust, and GMM 
regressions, but are not significant in the System GMM and IV specifications.  
 
4.  Does the Effect Go through Wage Flexibility? 
 
The estimations reported so aimed at estimating the reduced form of a model linking labor market 
regulations and inflation to employment elasticity. The key assumption used to derive the model is that 
labor market regulations increase employment elasticity because they reduce wage flexibility and that 
inflation can, by increasing real wage elasticity, undo the effect of labor market regulations and hence 
reduce employment elasticity.  Using this assumption, the model shows that countries with highly 
regulated labor markets and low inflation respond to shocks by adjusting employment (and hence have 
high employment Okun coefficients), while countries with a deregulated labor markets (or a regulated 
labor markets and some inflation) respond to shocks by adjusting real wages.  
The idea that there is a trade-off between adjustment in real wages and adjustment in employment 
is confirmed by Figure 3, which shows a strong negative correlation between real wages and employment 
elasticity. Similar evidence was found by Fallon and Lucas (2002), who showed that real wage flexibility 
limited the drop in employment in the countries that were hit by the East Asian crisis. Their analysis also 
shows that inflation played a key role and that the adjustment in real wages was mostly due to an increase 
in prices rather than to a drop in nominal wages. 
Since Section 3 provided evidence that the interaction between inflation and labor market 
regulations significantly affects employment elasticity, it is now interesting to look at whether the effect 
goes through real wage adjustment. We test this hypothesis by estimating the same model of Equation 12 
but substituting employment growth with growth in real wages (DW). It should be pointed out that real 
wages are likely to be subject to a much larger measurement error and thus the estimations of this section 
need to be interpreted with some caution.  
The model of Section 2 would predict a positive sign for the parameter attached to DYINF. As 
labor market regulations are assumed to increase real wage rigidity and as a consequence reduce the real 
wage to GDP elasticity, we expect the parameter attached to DYREG to be negative. At the same time, we 
expect the parameter attached to DYINFREG to be positive because, for a given level of labor market 
                                                                                                                                                                           
23 The three-year periods are: 1983-85, 1986-88, 1989-91, 1992-94, 1995-97, and 1998-2000.   16
regulations, inflation should increase real wage elasticity. Table 8 reports the estimates for the sample of 
industrial countries.
24  
Contrary to what we expected, the parameter attached to DYINF is always negative (but rarely 
statistically significant). As expected, we find that the coefficient attached to DYREG is always negative 
(but never statistically significant) and the coefficient attached to DYINFREG is always positive. The 
latter is statistically significant in the fixed effects, random effects, and robust regression. However, it is 
not significant in the GMM and IV regressions. It should also be pointed out that in the case of GMM 
estimations, the Sargan test does not reject the null hypothesis that the set of instruments is not valid, 
indicating that there may be problems with the specification used.
25  These results indicate that there is 
mixed evidence for the proposition that the interaction between inflation and labor market regulations is 




This paper takes on again the issue of inflation’s grease and sand effects on the labor market by studying 
the interaction between inflation and labor market regulations, and its effect on employment responses to 
changes in output. In the case of industrial countries, we find that, during periods of low inflation, labor 
market regulations increase the elasticity of employment to output. We also find that, in the absence of 
labor market regulations, inflation has a sand effect in the sense that it amplifies the employment 
responses to output changes. Nevertheless, our results show that this sand effect decreases when labor 
market regulations increase.  In particular, at very high levels of labor market regulations, inflation plays 
an important role in reducing the employment responses to changes in output. This leads us to conclude 
that inflation does grease the wheels of the labor market, but only when they are rusty. The results are 
weaker when we focus on developing countries, and we provide some evidence that that this could be due 
to lack of enforcement.  
  The results of this paper are clearly preliminary, and they need to be corroborated by more 
detailed country-specific studies. If proven to be true, however, they would yield important implications 
for the conduct of monetary policy, and especially for the inflation policy adopted by the European 
Central Bank.  In particular, our estimations suggest that countries with more rigid labor markets should 
allow for higher average inflation with respect to countries with more flexible labor markets. Hence, one 
                                                       
24 In the sample of developing countries, real wages are likely to be measured with a much larger error. In fact, 
estimates for this sample yield no significant result.  
25 The model does not satisfy Bond’s rule of thumb either. In fact, the coefficient attached to the lagged dependent 
variable is lower than the one obtained in the fixed effect specification and hence is not a convex combination of the 
OLS and fixed effect coefficients.   17
would expect to observe a tougher anti-inflation policy in the US (where the REG index is equal to zero) 
than in Euroland (where the average value for the REG index is 0.29). In reality, over the 1999-2001 
period, inflation in Euroland (2 percent) has been lower than inflation in the US (2.8 percent). Our results 
also suggest that there may be problems linked to having a unique inflation target for countries with very 
diverse labor market institutions. In particular, a level of inflation that may be optimal for countries with 
flexible labor markets like Ireland and the Netherlands may be too low for countries with highly regulated 
labor markets like Italy and Spain. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Variables  Definition and Source 
E  
 
Employment (millions) (Source: WEO-IMF, September 2002, variable: total 
employment with the exception of Barbados, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, 
Guatemala, Jamaica, Panama, Puerto Rico, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, 
U.S.A. and Venezuela whose source is ILO and it is completed applying the 
employment variation coefficient from WEO when necessary. Argentina and 
Mexico are from household surveys). 
W 
 
Real wage index (it is calculated by deflating the index by the CPI) (Source: 
WEO-IMF, September 2002, variable: hourly compensation, manufacturing 
sector. The source of Argentina and Colombia is ECLAC, Economic Surveys. For 
Hungary it is EIU, Annual World Tables, variable: average real wage index. 
Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil, Costa Rica, Cyprus,  Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El 
Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Jamaica, Luxembourg, Mexico, Nicaragua, 
Panama, Peru, Puerto Rico, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, U.S.A. and 
Venezuela come from ILO, manufacturing sector. Poland comes from IFS-IMF, 
CD-ROM, version 1.1.54, line 65. The data for Chile come from Boletines 
Mensuales, INE). 
U  Unemployment rate (Source: WEO-IMF, September 2002, variable: 
unemployment rate with the exception of U.S.A. whose source is The Economic 
Report of the President. Cyprus comes from WEO-IMF and WDI-WB, CD-ROM, 
version 4.2, variable: unemployment, total (% of total labor force). The source for 
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala, 
Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela 
is ECLAC completed with unemployment from ILO). 
Y  Gross domestic product (constant prices, billions of local currency) (Source: 
WEO-IMF, September 2002). 
INF  Inflation: Constructed using the CPI of WEO-IMF, September 2002, with the 
exception of Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, 
Guatemala, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, U.S.A. and 
Venezuela in which the CPI from IFS-IMF was used. 
REG  Job security index, it is calculated by summing up indemnities for dismissal in 
months of pay plus advance notice in months of pay (Source: Updated version of 
the index compiled by Pagés 2002, and based on Heckman and Pagés, 2000 and 
Pagés and Montenegro, 1999). 
RL  Rule of law, (Source: ICRG, variable: prslor) 
GDP 
PARTNER 
Trading partner’s GDP per capita growth (%, weighted average by trade share) 
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 Table 1. Summary Statistics 
Variable Obs.  Mean  Std.  Dev. Min  Max 
 ALL  COUNTRIES 
DE 496  0.015  0.022  -0.074  0.090 
DW 472  0.017  0.042 -0.232  0.267 
DY 496  0.030  0.028  -0.144  0.121 
INF 496  9.160  10.429  -1.166  49.197 
REG 496  0.322  0.209 0.000  1.000 
 INDUSTRIAL 
DE 289  0.010  0.019  -0.074  0.090 
DW 285  0.014  0.018 -0.044  0.068 
DY 289  0.028  0.020  -0.065  0.103 
INF 289  3.263  2.355 -1.000  14.644 
REG 289  0.202  0.127 0.000  0.649 
 DEVELOPING 
DE 207  0.023  0.023  -0.068  0.072 
DW 187  0.020  0.063 -0.232  0.267 
DY 207  0.033  0.037  -0.144  0.121 
INF 207  17.394  11.691  -1.166  49.197 
REG 207  0.490  0.185 0.177  1.000 
 
(DE, DW and DY are employment, wage and GDP growth respectively)   23
Table 2. Industrial Countries 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 






























DY  0.113 0.098 0.100 0.203 0.141 0.059 0.193 0.240 
  (0.81) (0.64) (0.74) (2.26)**  (1.25) (0.33) (0.89) (0.71) 
DYINF  0.090 0.090 0.085 0.063 0.092 0.094 0.077 0.103 
  (2.36)** (2.50)** (2.23)** (2.65)***  (2.99)***  (1.95)*  (2.14)** (1.36) 
DYREG  2.463 2.003 2.190 1.750 1.655 2.685 2.266 2.724 
  (3.37)*** (2.47)**  (3.19)*** (3.61)*** (2.81)*** (2.96)*** (1.81)*  (1.83)* 
DYINFREG  -0.416 -0.359 -0.357 -0.243 -0.343 -0.463 -0.371 -0.498 
  (2.41)** (2.05)** (2.08)** (2.43)** (2.46)** (2.14)** (1.84)*  (1.69)* 
INF  -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 0.002  -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 
  (1.27) (1.66)*  (2.08)**  (2.27)**  (2.20)**  (0.52) (1.63) (0.62) 
REG  0.084 2.297 -0.053  -0.137  0.000 0.277 -0.068  0.137 
  (1.20) (1.37) (2.56)**  (1.62) (0.01) (2.39)**  (1.88)*  (1.65)* 
INFREG  0.008 0.008 0.009 -0.001  0.007 0.004 0.009 0.009 
  (1.71)* (1.84)* (1.98)**  (0.50)  (1.91)* (0.67)  (1.94)* (1.26) 
LDE  0.373 0.44  0.402 0.402 0.455 0.418 0.346 0.369 
  (9.46)***  (11.01)*** (10.46)*** (13.92)*** (14.28)*** (9.03)***  (5.56)***  (5.93)*** 
YEAR  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 -0.000  0.000 0.000 
  (0.75) (0.95) (0.57) (4.54)***  (0.41) (0.10) (1.23) (1.03) 
Constant  -0.306 -0.800 -0.191 -1.599 -0.167 0.000  -0.302 -0.543 
  (0.83) (1.52) (0.56) (4.45)***  (0.56) (0.00) (1.20) (1.12) 
Observations  289 221 289 277 289 265 289 254 
Countries  21 13 21 20   21 21 21 
R-squared  0.67 0.75   0.89 0.82      















Absolute  value  of  t-statistics  in  parentheses        
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%        
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Table 2 (CONT): Industrial Countries, Different Indexes of Labor Market Regulations 




Job Security from Botero et al. 
Employment growth 
Fixed effects 
Ind. Relations from Botero et al. 
Employment growth 
Fixed effects 
Employment Protection from Nickell et al. 
DY 0.229  0.338  0.310 
 (1.99)**  (2.32)**  (2.49)** 
DYINF 0.052  0.055  0.047 
 (2.09)**  (2.03)**  (2.06)** 
DYREG 1.099  0.149  0.203 
 (2.69)***  (1.32)  (1.83)* 
DYINFREG -0.177  -0.041  -0.041 
 (1.81)*  (1.97)**  (2.00)** 
INF -0.001  -0.001  -0.001 
 (0.93)  (0.68)  (0.90) 
REG     0.001 
     (0.11) 
INFREG 0.004  0.001  0.001 
 (1.20)  (1.14)  (1.17) 
LDE 0.366  0.374  0.398 
 (10.58)***  (10.69)***  (11.79)*** 
YEAR 0.000  0.000  0.000 
 (1.01)  (1.02)  (0.83) 
Constant -0.298  -0.305  -0.261 
 (1.04)  (1.04)  (0.84) 
Observations 341  341  334 
Countries 20  20  19 
R-squared 0.67  0.66  0.70 
   Absolute  value  of  t-statistics  in  parentheses       
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Table 3. Grease and Sand Effect at Different Levels of Labor Market Regulation 
REG/INF  0.00 2.50 5.00 7.50 
0.00  0.11 0.34 0.56 0.79 
0.25  0.73 0.69 0.66 0.62 
0.50  1.34 1.05 0.75 0.46 
0.75  1.96 1.41 0.85 0.30   26
Table 4. Developing Countries 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)  (8)  (9)  (10) 











































DY  0.732 0.974 0.589 0.401 0.423 0.703 0.722  0.972  0.408  0.006 
  (1.83)*  (2.23)**  (1.53) (0.86) (1.36) (2.02)**  (1.76)* (0.06)  (1.36)  (0.01) 
DYINF  -0.036 -0.063 -0.027 -0.043 0.001  -0.036 -0.043  0.272  -0.019  -0.015 
  (1.25) (1.95)*  (1.00) (1.49) (0.06) (1.96)**  (1.49)  (0.47)  (0.91)  (0.51) 
DYREG  -0.780 -1.290 -0.450 -0.421 -0.206 -0.753 -0.728  -4.267  -0.153  0.213 
  (0.97) (1.46) (0.58) (0.45) (0.33) (1.04) (0.96)  (0.10)  (0.29)  (0.70) 
DYINFREG  0.078 0.132 0.050 0.078 0.032 0.076 0.082  -0.211 0.037  0.012 
  (1.26) (1.92)*  (0.86) (1.30) (0.66) (1.77)*  (1.40)  (0.11)  (0.91)  (0.57) 
INF  -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.002 -0.000 0.002  0.000  -0.012  0.000  0.002 
  (0.20) (0.00) (0.96) (1.55) (0.38) (2.37)**  (0.34)  (0.82)  (0.29)  (1.34) 
REG  -0.048 -0.048 -0.022 -0.017 -0.054 -0.053 0.005  -0.015     
  (0.91) (0.83) (0.61) (0.31) (1.30) (0.75) (0.18)  (0.02)     
INFREG  0.000  -0.001 0.002  0.004  -0.002 -0.004 0.000  0.017  -0.000  -0.001 
  (0.02) (0.27) (0.82) (2.16)**  (0.65) (1.97)**  (0.14)  (0.36)  (0.02)  (1.22) 
LDE  -0.061 -0.110 0.039  0.642  0.122  -0.085 -0.029  -0.639  -0.036  -0.050 
  (0.82) (1.35) (0.57) (10.05)***  (2.10)**  (1.49) (0.31)  (0.41)  (0.41)  (0.57) 
YEAR  -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001 
  (1.83)*  (1.91)*  (3.16)***  (1.30) (0.20) (0.57) (2.2)** (0.22)  (1.23)  (1.14) 
Constant  2.084 2.321 3.127 1.783 0.147 0.000 2.052  1.293  1.650  1.457 
  (1.85)*  (1.93)*  (3.16)***  (1.29) (0.17) (0.00) (2.19)**  (0.23)  (1.23)  (1.14) 
Observations  145 124 145 119 145 137 141  132  112  112 
Countries  14 11 14 12 14 14 13  14  12  12 
R-squared  0.27 0.27   0.64 0.61       0.22  0.25 




    




    




    
Absolute  value  of  t-statistics  in  parentheses         
*significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%         27
Table 5. Developing Countries: DE jure versus DE facto 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 











Arellano and Bond 
GMM 
Employment growth 
Arellano and Bover 
SYS-GMM 
DY 0.674  0.667  0.517  0.529  0.573 
 (1.55)  (1.62)  (1.35)  (1.42)  (1.66)* 
DYHRL -0.150  -0.874  0.258  0.774  -0.859 
 (0.11)  (0.85)  (0.22)  (0.68)  (1.04) 
DYINFHRL 0.067  0.062  0.035  0.058  0.038 
 (1.05)  (1.06)  (0.63)  (1.15)  (1.33) 
DYINFLRL -0.039 -0.029  -0.021  -0.027  -0.028 
 (1.23)  (1.01)  (0.74)  (1.35)  (1.22) 
DYREGHRL 0.716  1.984  -0.349  -0.625  2.375 
 (0.24)  (0.90)  (0.13)  (0.25)  (1.49) 
DYREGLRL -0.728  -0.560  -0.340  -0.377  -0.459 
 (0.85)  (0.69)  (0.45)  (0.49)  (0.75) 
DYINFREGHRL -0.351  -0.328  -0.165  -0.348  -0.294 
 (1.91)*  (1.98)**  (1.03)  (2.15)**  (3.68)*** 
DYINFREGLRL 0.093  0.057  0.062  0.060  0.062 
 (1.40)  (0.95)  (1.07)  (1.27)  (1.31) 
INF -0.001  -0.001  -0.000  0.001  -0.000 
 (0.49)  (1.15)  (0.31)  (1.76)*  (0.26) 
REG -0.047  -0.025  -0.050  0.043  -0.004 
 (0.87)  (0.70)  (1.06)  (0.55)  (0.20) 
INFREG -0.000  0.002 -0.002  -0.003  0.000 
 (0.04)  (0.84)  (0.62)  (1.52)  (0.11) 
LDE -0.019  0.057  0.136  -0.022  0.029 
 (0.25)  (0.80)  (1.98)*  (0.34)  (0.33) 
YEAR -0.001  -0.001  -0.001 -0.000  -0.001 
 (1.52)  (2.43)**  (1.07)  (0.07)  (2.26)** 
Constant 1.749  2.428 1.138  0.000  1.354 
 (1.54)  (2.44)**  (1.14)  (0.00)  (2.26)** 
Observations 141  141  141  133  137 
Countries 14  14    14  13 
R-squared 0.34   0.54     












Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses         
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Table 6. Industrial Countries, Unemployment Elasticity 
  (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6)  (7)  (8) (9) 






































from Botero et 
al. 
DY  0.072 0.060 -0.009  0.058 0.109 0.056  0.347  0.046 0.296 
  (0.90) (0.78) (0.15)  (0.75) (1.15) (0.49)  (1.59)  (0.70) (3.50)*** 
DYINF  0.071 0.071 -0.057  0.069 0.061 0.072  0.058  0.046 0.029 
  (3.24)*** (3.28)*** (3.48)***  (3.30)*** (2.41)**  (3.64)***  (1.16)  (3.20)*** (1.84)* 
DYREG  1.198 1.121 -1.509  1.120 1.125 1.407  1.249  1.009 0.001 
  (2.86)*** (2.87)*** (4.54)***  (2.79)*** (2.39)**  (2.4)**  (1.31)  (4.32)*** (0.02) 
DYINFREG  -0.301 -0.292 0.283  -0.258 -0.281 -0.338  -0.354  -0.172 -0.023 
  (3.03)*** (3.01)*** (4.11)***  (2.71)*** (2.51)**  (3.85)***  (1.85)*  (3.07)*** (1.91)* 
INF  -0.002 -0.002 -0.000  -0.002 -0.002 -0.002  -0.001  -0.001 -0.001 
  (2.44)**  (3.16)*** (0.56)  (2.59)**  (2.21)**  (3.4)***  (0.39)  (3.13)*** (1.34) 
REG  -0.031 -0.022 0.146  -0.046 -0.037 -0.037  0.001    
  (0.77) (1.83)*  (2.53)**  (1.20) (0.61) (2.00)**  (0.01)     
INFREG  0.006 0.007 0.001  0.006 0.008 0.008  0.006  0.005 0.000 
  (2.52)**  (2.77)*** (0.32)  (2.28)**  (2.43)**  (3.41)***  (1.34)  (2.77)*** (1.08) 
LDU  0.330 0.351 0.417  0.268 0.336 0.340  0.214  0.330 0.351 
  (8.76)*** (9.56)*** (11.40)***  (7.44)*** (8.75)*** (8.01)***  (3.42)***  (10.06)***  (10.61)*** 
YEAR  0.000 0.000 -0.001  0.000 -0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 0.000 
  (0.97) (0.57) (4.43)***  (1.61) (0.22) (0.28)  (1.75)*  (1.11) (0.87) 
Constant  -0.219 -0.118 1.105  -0.353 0.000 -0.061 -0.605  -0.197  -0.159 
  (0.98) (0.57) (4.28)***  (1.64) (0.00) (0.28)  (1.81)*  (1.15) (0.91) 
Observations  278 278 267  278 254 278  243  329 329 
Countries  21 21 20    21 21  21  20 20 
R-squared  0.68   0.82  0.70       0.70  0.69 




    




    




    
Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses         
*significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%     29
 
Table 7.  Industrial Countries, 3-Year Average 





















DY 0.083  -0.356 -0.105 0.018  0.260  1.129 
 (0.28)  (1.02) (0.40) (0.05)  (1.00) (0.80) 
DYINF 0.245  0.274 0.235 0.234  0.172 0.160 
 (2.55)**  (2.33)** (2.71)***  (1.90)*  (2.01)** (0.48) 
DYREG 0.448  0.754 0.676 0.597  0.296 0.004 
 (2.04)**  (3.01)*** (3.41)*** (2.08)**  (1.20)  (0.00) 
DYINFREG -0.132  -0.153 -0.166 -0.159  -0.075 -0.097 
 (2.03)**  (1.94)* (2.84)***  (1.91)*  (1.34)  (0.40) 
INF -0.014  -0.020 -0.014 -0.021  -0.012 -0.010 
 (1.70)*  (2.11)** (1.85)*  (1.94)*  (1.25)  (0.40) 
REG -0.040  -0.058 -0.161 -0.193  -0.036 0.016 
 (0.36)  (2.72)*** (1.61)  (1.17)  (1.48)  (0.08) 
INFREG 0.010  0.011 0.014 0.016  0.007 0.008 
 (1.93)*  (1.82)* (3.06)***  (2.52)** (1.08)  (0.48) 
LDE -0.025  0.173 -0.003  0.102  0.045 -0.001 
 (0.38)  (2.38)** (0.05)  (1.09)  (0.70)  (0.01) 
YEAR 0.003  0.001 0.002 0.001  0.002 -0.000 
 (1.34)  (0.39) (0.88) (0.53)  (0.95) (0.04) 
Constant 0.000  0.044 0.512   0.003 -0.093 
 (0.00)  (1.34) (1.15)   (0.08) (0.37) 
Observations 84  84 83 64  81 81 
Countries 20  20 20 17  17 20 
R-squared 0.84  0.79       0.64 















Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses           
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   30
Table 8. Industrial Countries, Wage Elasticity  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  (7)  (8) (9) 

























Job Sec. from 
Botero et al. 
Wage growth 
Fixed effects 
Ind. Rel. from 
Botero et al. 
DY  0.227 0.264 0.202 0.270 -0.047  0.129  -0.032  0.306 0.252 
  (1.08) (1.28) (1.46) (1.29) (0.86) (0.52)  (0.06)  (1.73)*  (1.11) 
DYINF  -0.086 -0.089 -0.051 -0.098 -0.047 -0.070  -0.024  -0.094 -0.085 
  (1.46) (1.48) (1.26) (1.68)*  (0.72) (0.87)  (0.19)  (2.37)**  (1.97)* 
DYREG  -1.299 -1.139 -0.293 -1.504 -1.211 -0.844  -1.279  -1.241 -0.206 
  (1.14) (1.05) (0.38) (1.33) (1.01) (0.59)  (0.47)  (1.99)**  (1.12) 
DYINFREG  0.572 0.534 0.325 0.641 0.427 0.501  0.430  0.421 0.085 
  (1.99)**  (1.83)* (1.73)* (2.24)**  (1.36)  (1.22)  (0.74) (2.80)***  (2.33)** 
INF  -0.000 0.002  -0.003 0.002  -0.003 0.000  -0.002  0.000  -0.001 
  (0.05) (0.87) (1.96)*  (0.83) (1.53) (0.04)  (0.50)  (0.08) (1.03) 
REG  0.022 0.079 0.107 0.087 -0.227  0.049  -0.060     
  (0.21) (2.25)**  (0.82) (0.87) (1.39) (0.81)  (0.48)     
INFREG  -0.017 -0.021 -0.009 -0.025 -0.008 -0.016  -0.014  -0.012 -0.001 
  (1.88)* (2.42)**  (1.71)* (2.81)***  (0.88)  (0.95)  (0.85) (2.52)**  (1.38) 
LDW  0.252 0.390 0.877 0.279 0.191 0.216  0.219  0.244 0.232 
  (4.87)*** (8.18)*** (21.93)***  (5.42)*** (3.49)*** (3.84)***  (3.69)***  (4.86)*** (4.59)*** 
YEAR  -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001  -0.001  -0.001 -0.001 
  (2.54)**  (2.27)**  (3.63)*** (2.19)**  (4.75)*** (1.97)**  (2.06)** (3.56)*** (3.74)*** 
Constant  1.289 1.037 1.843 1.112 0.000 1.159  1.376  1.545 1.627 
  (2.58)** (2.27)** (3.60)***  (2.23)** (0.00)  (1.98)**  (2.13)**  (3.60)***  (3.77)*** 
Observations  283 283 273 283 259 283  248  333 333 
Countries  21 21 20   21 21  21  20 20 
R-squared  0.21   0.69 0.44       0.20 0.19 




    




    




    
Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses           
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%        
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Figure 1. Industrial Relations and Job Security 
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